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No. 94-2483



                  ____________________________________

                     United States Court of Appeals



                         For the Seventh Circuit

                         Chicago, Illinois 60604

                      ____________________________









                   Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Chief Judge





UNITED STATES OF AMERICA           ] Appeal from the United

          Plaintiff-Appellee,      ] States District Court for

                                   ] the Northern District of

No. 94-2483              v.        ] Illinois, Eastern Division

                                   ] Division.

                                   ]

MICHAEL WILLIAMS,                  ]

          Defendant-Appellant.     ] No. 88 CR 204

                                   ]

                                   ] Harry  D. Leinenweber,

                                        Judge.



BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WITH APPENDIX


Submitted by Defendant-Appellant

Michael Williams

Postach 20

CH-3112

Allmendingen bei

Bern

Switzerland


pro se





Table of Contents





Table of Cases, Statutes, and Authorities....................iii



Statement of Subject Matter and Appellate Jurisdiction.........1



Statement of Issues Presented for Review.......................3



Statement of the Case..........................................4



Summary of Argument............................................6



Argument.......................................................7



     Statement of Facts........................................7





I. Whether the District Court erred; first,  in ordering

     unspecified restitution "under the auspices of the probation

     department," and second,in allowing the government's Motion

          for Forfeiture pursuant to that order.

     ..........................................................8



A.  The Order of Restitution was flawed insofar as it was too

     vague and left too much discretion to the probation depart-

          ment................................................8



     B. A Forfeiture order predicated on a flawed

          restitution order must be reviewed................12



C. Enforcement of a Forfeiture Order under the present

     circumstances should be barred by the doctrine of laches.

          .......................................................13





     II.  This Court should review the entire record below

     because of the strong possibility of other substantive

          and procedural errors resulting in substantial injustice

     to the Defendant-Appellant

           .... ...................................................14





Conclusion....................................................16



Appendix......................................................17







Table







of Cases, Statutes, and Authorities





Cases



United States Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit

United States v. Boula, 997 F. 2d 263 (7th Cir 1993)...........9

United States v. Braslawsky, 951 F. 2d 149 (7th Cir. 1991)....12

United States v. Fountain 768 F. 2d 790 (7th Cir. 1985),

rehearing denied, supplemented 777 F. 2d 344, certiorari

     denied 106 S. C. 1647, 475 U.S. 1124, 90 L.Ed. 2d 191....12



United States v. Gomer, 764 F. 2d 1221, 1224 (7th Cir. 1985)..14

United States v. Lovett, 811 F.2d 979, 990 (7th Cir. 1987)....11

United States v. Mohammad, 53 F. 3rd 1426 (7th Cir. 1993).....10

United States v. Sung, 51 F. 3rd 92, 94 (7th Cir. 1995).......10

United States v. Simpson, 8 F. 3rd, 546, 551 (7th Cir. 1993)..15



United States Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit



United States v. Pendergast, 979 F. 2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1992)..13









United States Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit



United States v. Diamond. 969 F. 2d 961, C.A. 10 (Okl)  1992..12



United States Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit



United States v. Sasnett, 925 F. 2d 392, 399-400 (11th Cir.

1991).........................................................13



United States District Courts

United States v. Savely, 814 F. Supp. 1519, D. Kansas 1993,

reconsideration granted 827, F. Supp. 668......................8





Statutes

18 U.S.C.  1341..............................................4

18 U.S.C.  1343..............................................4

18 U.S.C.  3663..............................................6

18 U.S.C.  3663(a)...........................................8



Rules of Procedure

Fed. R.App.P. 10(c)...........................................1

Fed. R.App.P. 28(b)Seventh Circuit............................1

Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b)..........................................14



Statement of Subject Matter and Appellate Jurisdiction



     This is a direct criminal appeal seeking a review of all

proceedings below, and particularly review of an Order of

Restitution and subsequent Forfeiture Order issued by the District

Court.

          Pursuant, presumably to the Order of Restitution, the

Government moved for forfeiture of certain property in February of

1994. A hearing was held in March 1994. Mr. Robert Clark, then

private counsel for Michael Williams, raised several objections to

that order. (Appendix, p. 21-23)

     The Order of Forfeiture contested herein was entered in April,

1994.

     The Defendant-Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on or about

June 10, 1994 and paid the docketing fee.

     The Defendant-Appellant was unable to reach an agreement for

services with his attorney for the prosecution of this appeal, and

was unable to obtain the record below for the purpose of producing

this brief in a timely manner. For that reason, this Jurisdictional

Statement will necessarily be defective with respect to

Fed.R.App.P. 7th Circuit Rule 28(b).

     Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P Rule 10(c), the Defendant-Appellant

will develop the evidence from the available documents, personal

files and journals, and his best recollection.

     On information and belief, the Order of Forfeiture is

immediately appealable. Such orders fall generally within the scope

of appealable rulings. The Defendant-Appellant has the

understanding that orders are appealable when their  execution has

immediate or irreversible consequences to the affected party.  The

sale to be authorized is final, and the issues before the court in

a  forfeiture order are separable from other aspects of the case.





Statement of Issues Presented for Review







1. Whether the District Court erred; first,  in ordering

unspecified restitution "under the auspices of the probation

department," and second,in allowing the government's Motion for

Forfeiture pursuant to that order.



2. Whether this Court should, on its own motion, review the entire

record on Defendant's behalf for plain error.













Statement of the Case







     The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Williams, was arrested on

March 18, 1988 and charged initially with conspiracy to commit

mail

fraud based upon unpaid invoices submitted to a corporation of

which he was an officer. On information and belief, no other

alleged coconspirator was ever prosecuted. On August 11, 1988

Williams signed a plea of guilty to one count of mail fraud under

18 U.S.C.  1341, and one count of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C.

1343 in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division (Leinenweber, Judge). Defendant was

sentenced to 2 years in prison and five years of probation to be

served consecutively, and a restitution order to be determined by

the probation department. The order was not specific as to the

amount paid or as to the last payment date. Williams served the

prison term and was released, completing his probation without

incident. In March of 1994, six years after the original arrest,

the government moved for forfeiture of certain personal property

previously seized. Williams, through his counsel, Robert G. Clarke,

opposed the motion in writing (Appendix p. 21-23), but the District

Court, per order of Judge Leinenweber, granted the government's

motion without hearing argument by defense counsel. The

Defendant-

Appellant then requested that counsel be appointed for the purpose

of appealing the order. The request was denied, and Defendant-

Appellant filed a notice of appeal pro se.



     Williams then filed three motions on May 10, 1995; (1) for an

order to the FBI to produce all of the Defendant's seized property

for inspection by the court, (2) for an order to the FBI to release

the Defendant's file under the Freedom of Information Act, and (3)

for an order to use Registered Air Mail for all Court

correspondence. All of these motions were denied by this court.



     Williams filed a Third Party Minor Claim to Ownership of

Unlawfully Seized property on May 16, 1995, and six motions on

July

14, 1995:

 (1) for a Copy of the Government's Answer,

(2)  to Dismiss the Motion to Authorize Sale of Coins and  Disburse

Proceeds, and to Return Property to Defendant,

(3) for a Subpoena of Records

(4) for a transfer of jurisdiction

(5) to submit a Financial Affidavit

(6) to make transcripts a part of the record.

     All of these motions were denied. Williams has also repeatedly

requested an enlargement of time for the filing of this brief and

copies of the record below.

     On August 16, 1995 the Court issued a requirement that the

appellant's brief be submitted by September 25, 1995. In its notice

to the Defendant, the Court stipulated that the usual allowance for

mail delays would not be granted.









Summary of Argument







1. The District Court erred in granting the government's motion

for forfeiture of his personal property for purposes of restitution

insofar as restitution orders  pursuant to 18 U.S. 3663, as

interpreted by the Seventh Circuit, must meet certain criteria of

clarity in amounts, scheduling of payments, and judicial oversight,

none of which was applied correctly by the District Court.



2. Because the Defendant-Appellant is not an attorney, he has been

unable to present his case or prepare his appeal in a professional

manner. This Court is asked to review the entire record below for

plain error.  Given the flawed order of restitution issued by the

District Court, the failure of defense counsel to challenge that

order, and a series of alleged irregularities  throughout the

proceedings,  a review of the entire record by this Court is

appropriate in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice.



                                Argument





                           Statement of Facts





     Michael Williams, a businessman, composer, and political

activist, was at his Colorado home on March 18, 1988, when the

F.B.I. arrested him and seized a number of items of personal

property. Mr. Williams was charged as a co-conspirator to commit

mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1342, and 1343.  The

government alleged that Williams, as President of Pioneer America,

Inc,(hereinafter Pioneer) a Delaware corporation, conspired to

defraud creditors. At that time, Pioneer owed approximately

$230,000. On information and belief, no other officer of Pioneer

was prosecuted, and no co-conspirator was available as a witness.

On August 18, 1988, Williams pled guilty to one count of mail fraud

(18 U.S.C. 1341) and one count of wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343) in

the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division. He was sentenced to two years in prison and five

years of probation, to be served consecutively. He was ordered to

pay restitution as determined by the United States Probation

Department. He served his prison sentence, and completed the full

term of probation without further incident.  In June of 1991, he

requested and received permission to travel to Switzerland in order

to marry his fiancÚ, a Swiss citizen.

     In March 1994, the Government moved to allow the forfeiture

and sale of Williams' seized personal property, apparently pursuant

to the order for restitution. The Government's motion was allowed,

although opposed by defense counsel Robert Clarke, however, the

motion was allowed. The Defendant then filed a pro se appeal in

June 1994.



I. Whether the District Court erred; first,  in ordering

unspecified restitution "under the auspices of the probation

department," and second,in allowing the government's Motion for

Forfeiture pursuant to that order.









A.  The Order of Restitution was flawed insofar as it was too vague

and left too much discretion to the probation department.



      Restitution awards are criminal penalties. United States v.

Savely, 814 F. Supp. 1519, D. Kansas 1993, reconsideration granted

827, F. Supp. 668  and for that reason must be ordered in

accordance with criminal statutes. Restitution orders are governed

by 18 U.S.C. 3663(a)(1) which states:



          The court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of

     an offense under this title or under subsection (h), (i),

     (j), or (n) of section 902 of the Federal Aviation Act of

     1958 (49 U.S.C. 1472), may order, in addition to or in

     lieu of any other penalty authorized by law, that the

          defendant make restitution to any victim of the offense.



     The Seventh Circuit has consistently interpreted this

provision to require that the District Court determine the amounts

and terms of payments, and specify the beginning and ending

periods

of scheduled payments, while retaining jurisdiction and oversight

over the entire process. The Court has specifically criticized and

vacated any and every order of restitution which vaguely allows

the

terms and amounts of restitution to be "worked out," or determined

by the Probation Department.

     Although not available in written form to the Defendant as a

separate document, the Order of Restitution of the District Court

(Judge Leinenweber) follows, as copied from the Transcript of the

Sentencing Hearing, Page 91, lines 15-18:



"...you are to make restitution to the proper parties on

     a best efforts basis, as worked out through the auspices

     of the Probation Department. I don't intend to make it

          impossible for you and your family to live."



     A similar order of restitution was found to be inappropriate

in United States v. Boula, 997 F. 2d 263, 269 (7th Cir. 1993).

Boula pled guilty to three counts of mail fraud and was sentenced

by Brian Barnett Duff, J. to 62 months imprisonment, three years of

supervised release, and $5 million dollars of restitution "in a

manner to be suggested by the probation officer and when [they

have] the capacity to do so." On appeal, the Seventh Circuit,

(Coffey and  Easterbrook, Circuit Judges and Lay, Senior Circuit

Judge) reviewed the matter. Judge Coffey, writing for the Court,

found that "too much discretion in the management of the

restitution order was left in the hands of the probation

department."  Judge Coffey found that the District Court should

have ordered the Defendants to begin paying restitution upon

release from prison, with the understanding that if the original

restitution order proved to be insurmountable, the Defendants and

probation officer should return before the court.

     The Seventh Circuit reiterated this point as recently as March

24, 1995 in United States v. Sung, 51 F. 3rd 92, 94 (7th Cir.

1995). In that case, Kim Tae Sung was convicted of selling

counterfeit commodities under 18 U.S.C.  2320(a). The case was

tried before Judge Duff, and Sung was sentenced to a prison term

and ordered to pay $2,160 in installments  "to be determined by

the

probation office." On appeal, the Seventh Circuit (Flaum and

Easterbrook, Circuit Judges, and Crabb, District Judge> reviewed

the order. Judge Easterbrook, for the court, opined



     when a court permits the defendant to make restitution in

     installments, the judge must specify the schedule; this

     task may not be left to the staff. E.g. , United States

     v. Ahmad, 2 F. 32 245, 248-49 (7th Cir. 1993); United

     States v. Boula, 997 F. 2d 263, 269 (7th Cir. 1993. Boula

     disapproved an identical provision by the district judge

     who presided in this case. The order of restitution must

          be reconsidered.





     The same position was taken on April 27, 1995 in United States

v. Mohammad 53 F. 3rd 1426, 1438-1439 (7th Circuit, 1995).

Mohammad

was convicted of conspiracy and multiple counts of bankruptcy

fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, and Currency Transaction Reporting

Act violations in a four-week jury trial before Judge Duff. He was

sentenced to a prison term of 92 months, a fine of $9,600, and

restitution of $3.2 million "in a manner to be determined by the

probation officer." Mohammad did not challenge the restitution

order, however, the Court (Goodwin, Ripple, and Manion, Circuit

Judges) on its own initiative, reviewed the record for plain error,

vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for further

proceedings.  In his opinion for the Court, Judge Ripple stated:



     a court abdicates its judicial responsibility when it

          authorizes a probation officer to determine the manner of

     restitution. (1438)



The court reviewed the body of case law concerning restitution

orders which has arisen in the 7th Circuit since the Boula

decision, and concluded:



     Under the case law of this circuit, it is a serious

     structural defect in the criminal proceedings. It

     seriously affects the integrity of those proceedings. For

     these reasons, the order of restitution entered against

          Mr. Mohammad and Mr. Saleh is deficient.





     The District Court's order in the present case was similarly

defective, using the same unacceptably vague language as the

orders

in Boula, Ahmad, Sung, and Mohammad.

     In addition to the fact that the District Court erroneously

delegated the oversight of William's restitution to the Probation

Department, the amount of restitution to be paid was unspecified.

     In United States v. Brothers, 955 F. 2d 493, 498, (7th Cir.

1992) citing United States v. Lovett, 811 F.2d 979, 990 (7th Cir.

1987),Judge Kanne of this Court stated, "if restitution is ordered,

the amount must be exact and not approximate."

     When restitution is applicable, payments are to be made over

a period of not more than 5 years at most, nor beyond the period of

the Defendant's probation. United States v. Diamond, 969 F. 2d 961,

(C.A. 10 1992).  The actual period must be included within the

restitution order.  United States v. Fountain, 768 F. 2d 790 (7th

Cir. 1985), rehearing denied, supplemented 777 F. 2d 344,

certiorari denied 106 S.C. 1647, 475 U.S. 1124, 90 L.Ed. 2d 191.

     Clearly, the restitution order in the court below failed in

every respect to meet the standards set forth under 18 U.S.C.

3663, as interpreted by the Seventh Circuit. The failure to meet

these standards necessarily requires reversal of the order, and a

review of the Order of Forfeiture and any proceeds the government

may have distributed thereunder.

B. A Forfeiture order predicated on a flawed restitution order must

be reviewed.

     In reviewing an order of forfeiture, predicated  upon an order

of restitution, the Court must determine first whether an agreement

to pay a specific amount of restitution was in force, and secondly,

whether the restitution to be paid corresponds to the offense of

conviction.  United States v. Braslawsky, 951 F. 2d 149, 150 (7th

Cir. 1991).

     The District Court has no authority to order forfeiture of

property to pay restitution six years after a defendant is

convicted. If an order is granted it must be granted at the time of

the sentencing hearing. This is the plain meaning of the language

in 18 U.S.C.  3663(a), United States v. Pendergast, 979 F. 2d 1289

(8th Cir. 1992). "There is no statutory or other provision that

authorizes a sentencing court to leave the question of restitution

open to an uncertain date" United States v. Sasnett, 925 F. 2d 392,

399-400 (11th Cir. 1991). Consequently, the only basis on which the

District Court could have granted the government's request for

forfeiture would have been the enforcement of the flawed

restitution order.

     In the present case, there was no agreement to pay an exact

sum in restitution, no schedule of payments, and no indication of

the date on which those payments were to terminate. The holding

in

Pendergast would indicate that such an order is fatally defective,

and therefor not enforceable.

     Because the Restitution Order was defective, it was not

enforceable, and the District Court erred in granting the

forfeiture of personal property as part of its enforcement.



C. Enforcement of a Forfeiture Order under the present

circumstances should be barred by the doctrine of laches.



     Even if the Order of Restitution were valid, and the Order of

Forfeiture appropriate, it would be unjust to allow the government

to wait six years after the seizure of property and sentencing of

the defendant to request forfeiture.  The decision to use

forfeiture powers in February 1994 amounts to laches under the

facts and circumstances of this case.

     The property in question was seized in March, 1988. The

government was at all times aware of the whereabouts of the

Defendant. His restitution order was subject to his ability to pay.

In the absence of a specified amount to be paid or a specified date

for the payments, it was inappropriate to forfeit seized property

to be "distributed" to purported victims.

     The Defendant served his sentence and properly completed his

period of probation. He has left the United States, married a Swiss

citizen, and is raising a family. His income as a language tutor is

insufficient to generate large sums of money, and his wife is

currently unemployed following the birth of their child.  He has

never had less of an ability to pay restitution than at present.

     None of the seized items was purchased from proceeds of the

allegedly fraudulent business. The forfeiture, six years after

seizure, four years after sentencing, and within eight months of

the end of the Defendant's probation, is at best inappropriate and

unduly burdensome.



II.  This Court should review the entire record below because of

the strong possibility of other substantive and procedural errors

resulting in substantial injustice to the Defendant-Appellant.



     Issues not raised in the trial court are subject to review

for plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b) "Plain errors or defects

affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not

brought to the attention of the court." United States v. Gomer, 764

F. 2d 1221, 1224 (7th Cir. 1985), United States v. Brothers, supra

497.

     In United States v. Seacott, 15 F. 3rd, 546, 551 (7th Cir.

1993), this court noticed a sentencing guideline error not raised

by the defendant at trial. In United States v. Simpson, 8 F. 3rd,

546, 551 (7th Cir. 1993), this court again followed the plain error

standard of review because the defendant failed to object to issues

raised on appeal.

     This Court is asked to consider whether the Defendant-

Appellant had ineffective assistance of council. According to

William's recollection, Mr. Stevens induced him to plead guilty

with the stipulation that he would be permitted to see his newborn

daughter, purportedly dying of spinal meningitis in Rome, Georgia.

Neither Mr. Stevens nor the Assistant United States Attorney

included this provision in the agreement, and Judge Marovich,

sitting temporarily on the day of sentencing, accepted the plea

with apparent reservations.

      This Court is asked to determine whether the District Court

gave due consideration to the objections to Forfeiture raised by

attorney Robert Clarke on behalf of Mr. Williams (Appendix, pp 21-

23). According to Williams, the Court refused to allow oral

argument by defense Counsel Clarke when the matter was heard,

and

disregard attorney Clarke's written objections.













Conclusion and Relief Sought



     Based on the foregoing, the Defendant-Appellant now requests

that the Order of Forfeiture be vacated, that this case be

remanded to the District Court for proceedings not inconsistent

with the applicable statutes, and the personal property of the

Defendant-Appellant or the proceeds from the sale thereof not be

disbursed before all issues before the Court are resolved.



     Signed and submitted this ________ day of September, 1995.









                                   By the Defendant-Appellant





                                   ______________________________

Michael Williams

     Postach 59

                                                         CH-3110 Msingen

                                                        Switzerland

                                                              pro se



Certificate of Service





I, Michael Williams, the Defendant-Appellant in the present case,

hereby certify that I have served two copies of the foregoing brief

upon counsel for Appellee United States of America by directing my

agent to have the same delivered by Federal Express to James B.

Burns, United States Attorney, or Carol A. Davilo, Assistant United

States Attorney, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, IL 60604, USA,

costs prepaid, this ___ day of September, 1995.





_____________________



Michael Williams





Appendix to Appellant Brief



                                    Table of Contents









1. Motion for Forfeiture of Property.......................18



2. Defendant's Response to Forfeiture Motion...............21



3. Order of Forfeiture.....................................24



4. Corrections of Sentencing Hearing Transcript............26



5. Proposed Order to Vacate Order of Forfeiture............30



6. Statement that all required materials are in Appendix...31







MICHAEL WILLIAMS              )

Postfach 20                   )

CH-3112 Allmendingen bei Bern )

Switzerland                   )



CORRIGENDUM OF TRANSCRIPT:

 REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - PLEA BEFORE THE HONORABLE

GEORGE M. MAROVICH



The following is a Corrigendum of the official transcript of

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - PLEA BEFORE THE HONORABLE GEORGE

M.MAROVICH which Geraldine D. Monahan, a/k/a Geri Monahan,

Official Court Reporter, recorded on 11. August 1988 at 3:30 p.m.

and submitted on 7. October 1994. This Corrigendum is prepared

without the benefit of the audio tape recording which was made of

the hearing, which, despite my persistent requests, has not been

made available to me. The purpose of this Corrigendum is to

perfect the highly inaccurate official transcript to the best of

my ability, within the confines of my limited means.



On 14. November 1994, I finally received the transcript from

Geraldine D. Monahan which I had been requesting since 11. August

1988, and found it to be highly inaccurate. There are substantial

errors in the transcript, including, but not limited to:



1.)  Omitted: Hon. George M. Marovich asking Assistant U.S.

Attorney Laurie Barsella who all the other names (besides mine)

on the indictment are, and why they aren't in court with me; why

I'm the only one there, facing the charges. His statement, as I

recall, was: "Who are all these other names? Why aren't they

here?

     Why is this man standing here all alone?" Ms. Barsella

responded: "Uh, they're his co-conspirators, your Honour." Judge

Marovich then asked "Then why aren't any of them here?" Ms.

Barsella did not respond.



2.)  Omitted: Hon. George M. Marovich asking Assistant U.S.

Attorney Laurie Barsella: "What the hell are you trying to do,

send an innocent man to prison?"



3.)  Omitted: All open, audible discussions between my court-

appointed attorney, William J. Stevens and I, which have been

marked "soto voce".





4.)  Omitted: Hon. George M. Marovich asking me exactly what had

transpired and my refraining from answering, and suggested that

he ask Assistant U.S. Attorney Laurie Barsella what happened,

since she was the one accusing me. When she began to recite what

I believe was the indictment, not speaking from memory, Judge

Marovich became angry, and told her that he wanted to hear me

answer the question, not her.



5.)  Omitted: On page 5, line 9, Hon. George M. Marovich asking

me: "And are you satisfied with the advice and efforts of your

attorney?" Before reluctantly answering "Yes" on line 11 of the

same page, I intentionally paused for a great length of time, as

I emphatically nodded my head "no" several times, and my court-

appointed attorney, William J. Stevens, twisted my arm, and

warned me to answer "yes". The pause was of such great length

that it should properly be recorded in the transcript as "lengthy

pause". It does not. On the contrary, it reads as if I

immediately answered "Yes", when in fact, I hesitated an enormous

length of time.



6.)  Omitted: On approximately page 18, line 7, there should

appear Assistant U.S. Attorney Laurie Barsella's statement to the

effect: "He participated in a scheme to  defraud, Your Honour".

It has been completely omitted.



7.)  Omitted: When Judge Marovich explained my rights to me,

including my right to a trial by jury, I loudly advised William

J. Stevens that I wished to have a trial,and, if possible,

immediately. This important statement has been completely

omitted, or hidden behind a false "soto voce".



There are also some segments in the transcript which I would like

to draw attention to, including, but not limited to:



8.)  On page 14, line 8, Assistant U.S. Attorney Laurie Barsella

states that "As a further part of the scheme, the defendant

telephoned a number of businesses throughout the United States

and identified himself using various names and represented that

he had computer paper to sell."



     Ms. Barsella was well aware that the corporation I was

President of, Pioneer America Corporation, sold its product

almost exclusively to one major corporation. There was almost no

reason to seek additional customers, since this



- 2 -



     one large account purchased nearly all of the corporation's

product. She was also aware that, in the event someone associated

with the corporation was going to be selling any products

included in its product line, it would not be me. She also knew

who it would have been, had this been the case.



     Ms. Barsella also refrains from mentioning the names of

other individuals, one in  particular, and his associates, who

would have been far more likely to be  "telephoning a number of

businesses throughout the United States", representing that they

had computer paper to sell than me. I had no control over such

persons, and almost no knowledge of anything they were doing. The

aforementioned individual, whom I have never even met, resided

in

a distant state, far from my home in Colorado. Although Ms.

Barsella was keenly aware of this, she chose, as Judge Marovich

observed, to force me to take all the blame for actions she

defined as "crimes". I was so appalled at one particular "crime"

that I was accused of, in the state of Texas, that at my

sentencing hearing, I    insisted on taking the stand in my own

defence, since my court-appointed attorney was allowing so many

lies to be told. I was accused of defrauding a corporation in

Texas out of computer paper, however, as I emphatically explained

to Judge Leinenweber, under oath, this was absolutely not the

case, at all. Normal business transactions were turned

into crimes, and this is the real crime.



9.)  On page 15, line 25, through page 16, line 8, Assistant U.S.

Attorney Laurie Barsella states that "In addition, as part of the

scheme, on July 16, 1986, the defendant used a false name, Phil

Ross, of Nexus Laboratories in connection with mail box at

Accurate Message Center in Addison, Illinois. That mail box was

used to conduct and carry on the scheme that was described above,

and the use of that mail box violates Title 18, United States

Code, Section 1342. Our evidence on that, of course, would be

documents from the Accurate Message Center as well as from an

employee of the Accurate Message Center."



On page 16, lines 20 through 23, my court-appointed attorney

(after a discussion with me improperly noted as "soto voce")

states: "He says he didn't use the name Phil Ross or open the

answering services, but the analysis is substantially correct.

     And he concedes that the government's-- the rest of the

recitation is completely accurate. I most certainly did not

"concede" that the "recitation" was "completely accurate". Those

are Mr. Stevens' words, not mine. This is another attempt by Mr.

Stevens to force guilt and responsibility on me, rather than

defend me.



- 3 -





As I have written Hon. George M. Marovich previously, "The audio

recording, unlike a transcript written over six years later, is

one-hundred percent accurate, and any changes or alterations in

it would be easily distinguishable by an audio expert. I consider

this audio recording as evidence pertaining to, among other

issues, the grossly unethical conduct of my court-appointed

attorney, William J. Stevens, and request that you order

the audio recording to be seized and independently stored in a

secure location to be held as evidence."



I am willing to personally prepare an accurate written transcript

if the Court will provide me with a copy of the audio transcript.



                              Respectfully submitted,









                              MICHAEL WILLIAMS, in Pro Se

                              Postfach 20

                              CH-3112 Allmendingen bei Bern

                              Switzerland



United States Court of Appeals  peals

For the Seventh Circuit

                         Chicago, Illinois 60604











Before





          Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Chief Judge



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA           ] Appeal from the United

          Plaintiff-Appellee,      ] States District Court for

                                   ] the Northern District of

No. 94-2483              v.        ] Illinois, Eastern Division

                                   ] Division.

                                   ]

MICHAEL WILLIAMS,                  ]

          Defendant-Appellant.     ] No. 88 CR 204

                                   ]

                                   ] Harry  D. Leinenweber,

                                        Judge.







                               O R D E R

     This matter came before the Court on Appeal by the Defendant-

Appellant Michael Williams. The Court decides




(1)  that the Forfeiture Order is hereby VACATED,



(2) the Defendant-Appellant sentence as it relates to restitution

is VACATED,



(3) The property listed in the Order of Forfeiture or the proceeds

thereof are to be held by the District Court pending the outcome of

any further hearings.



(4) This case is REMANDED to the District Court for proceedings not

inconsistent with our precedents.







                              ENTER:



                                        _________________________



Statement that Appendix Contains All Required Materials







    The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Williams, has compiled this

Appendix to the best of his ability and included therein all of the

materials which he believes to be necessary for the purposes of

this appeal.



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